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                              Irmtroduxetiorm
  The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed on 15 November 1955. From that
time to the present day the LDP has domixxated the Japanese political scene, holding
power throughout except for a brief period of one year from 1993 to X994 when
opposition parties managed to form a coaiitioxx aitd end the LDP's moxxopoly of power.
The coa}ition was uxxable to hold together, although long enough to pass }egislation
which made chaxxges to the election system, in particular, aimed at endixxg the way
parties received fvgnding from outside interests. The fina} legislation passed did xxot go
far enovkgh but did make the significant change of ixxtrodvkcing single-seat
constituencies as a part of that process.
  In 1994 the LDP came back to power in the most vgnlikely of coaiitions, together
with their main ideologica} rivals over the decades, the Japan Socialist Party, now
renamed the Sociai Democratic Party, and Sakigake, a spiinter group of dissident LDP
po}iticians. in this vgn}ikeliest of coalitions, Tomiichi Murayama, the SDP leader,
became Prime ]V[inister. After Mvkrayama stepped down in January 1996, Ryvktaro
Hashimoto took over as Prime Minister in the coalition. The comeback of the LDP
was al} bvkt comp}ete after the e}ectioit results of 1996. Since then the LDP has
remained in power but has been uxxable to solve the covgntry's economic ills axxd is
coxxtixxuovksly dogged by scaitdais withixx the party aitd bureaucracy.
  Currently Koizumi, rather than the LDP, is extremely popular with the pvgb}ic
because of his promises to push throvggh critical reforms. Expectations among the
public are high that Koizumi is the man for the job. Shovgld he fail to deliver at least
some of his promises, it covgld have seriovgs repercussioxxs for the fvktvgre e}ectabi}ity of
the LDP.
  in this paper I wili examine the main events since 1955 aitd reasons which
contributed to the loss of power in X993.
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                            X955 to the 1970s
On 15 November 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party came into existence as a direct
response to the threat the Socia}ist Party posed at the time.
   The pre-war rulixxg elite gave them all the financial backing necessary to
guarantee power, but the coxxservatives learnt to become better organised at grass
roots leve}, in particu}ar, organisation in the rura} areas, which was the key to
holding power, throvkgh the estab}ishment of koenkai and pork-barrel politics to gaixx
svgpport. The Socialists, on the other hand, did not have the same level of financial
backing afforded the LDP, most of its support was union based which meant urban
areas, and they had difficu}ty holding the party together because of ideo}ogical
differences. Their refusal to change their antipathy towards the Japait-US mi}itary
alliance as well as their support for the Soviet/ East Europeaxx form of socia}ism with
the coming of the Korean War and the general move towards a bi-polar world made
the Socialists increasing}y uxxappealixxg to the e}ectorate in the X960s. In addition, the
LDP had a}} the means at its disposai including bribery, ba}lot-rigging,
gerrymanderixxg and coersioxx as well as successful economic po}icies to persuade the
electorate to vote for them. Besides, the electorate had oniy ever experienced a police
state or military occupation, had seen how the brief liberalisation period had been
taken away from them by the very forces that had ixxtrodvkced it in the first p}ace,
were faced with the realisation that the pre-war rvgling e}ite was still in charge, and
were too bvksy trying to survive.
   The `developmental state' ecoxxomic policies initiated by the bureaucracy under
MITI aitd the Fixxance Ministry which was adopted by the top-heavy ex-bureavkcratic
LDP proved to be spectacular}y successful. The decade of the X960s saw the LDP move
away from a state of `potentiai' rvklixxg party to a party destined to rule `in
perpetvgity', or so it appeared.
   The rea} struggle for power in the political system was among the LDP itseif,
among the five to seven factions which made up the party. In 1972, Kakuei Tanaka
became Prime Minister. This was a milestone in the history of the LDP. For the first
time someone outside the bureaucratic or university elites had become Prime Minister.
He had a iimited high schoo} edvgcation and came from the rura} backwater of
Niigata. He took pork-barrel politics to a new }evel; his Niigata constituency stood by
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him even throvggh the worst moments of the Lockheed scanda} because he was one of
their own and looked after them. They received the largest benefits of axxy prefecture.
`For every yen ixx taxes sent to Tokyo, they received three in retvgm'.i He
ovktmanoevgvered the maixx opposition to him ixx the LDP, Takeo Fukuda, and
infiltrated key ministries with his owxx people, setting up systems of `zoku' to
inflvkence decisioit making. He did itot invent corrvgption withixx the po}itical system, he
perfected it. Throvggh the system of `favours for money' he was able to build up the
most powerfvgl faction within the LDP. The size aitd domixxance of his faction upset
the relative balance within the party itself creating the potential for greater schisms
ixx the fvktvgre. Tanaka became the greatest exponent of `the power behixxd the scenes',
vgntil he lost contro} of his own faction in 1986. His pvgpi}s leamt from the master axxd
learnt to use the system in the same way.
   When the Lockheed scandal broke ixx 1976 it damaged the LDP considerab}y. There
was the first split, as disaffected party members left to form the New Libera} Ciub.
Corrvgption among politicians was we}1 known but the scale of the money invo}ved and
at the very top of the po}itical and bvgsiness worlds as we}1 as ixxvolvement of the
underworld left an indelib}e mark on the public at large. To make matters worse,
there was xxo sense of wrong-doing, Tanaka showed no remorse and continvged to serve
as a member for Niigata into the X980s. The LDP showed itself to be arrogant and to
have total disregard for pubiic opixxion. The LDP was sowing the seeds of its own
downfal}.
                   Tke X980s to the Banbble Cmisis
As long as the economy was performing we}1, the public tended to look the other way
bvkt Japan had moved on, it was no longer a `developmentai state' by the end of the
60s, it was a fu11y-indvgstria}ised nation and a major exporter. Economic GNP growth
had siowed from ten per cent axxnua}}y to haK especial}y after the first oil crisis.
Japan was becoming the `nail that sticks out' economica}ly but the LDP, because of
its dependeitce oit speciai ixxterest grovgps }ike the farmers and certain bvgsixxess sectors
for support, failed to initiate a chaxxge of directioxx continuing the same policies of a
1 Louis D.Hayes, lntrodzscttore to gopanese Pogttlcs, (seeond edition, New York: Paragon, 1995),
chapter 5, p. 108.
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 `deve}opmental state' long after the policies had outgrowxx their usefulness to the
point where they were becomixxg covknter-prodvkctive. Later, when Japan needed to
change direction, the system was unable or uxxwi}}ing to respoxxd quickly.
   The 1980s was anether economic boom period, reachixxg its zenith at the end of
X989, but it was a `boom-bust' expansion. The Finance Ministry pushed the Bank of
Japait to lower interest rates and to make }oans freely avai}abie. The resvk}t was too
much money ixx the economy resu}ting in wild specvglation both at home and abroad.
When the government fixxaiiy acted in 1989 the econemic bvkbble burst, causing maity
speculators to lose their assets.
   The 1980s also saw pressvkre grow oxx Japait to open vgp its markets to ovgtside
competitioxx, the P}aza Accord of 1985, resuked in the rapid appreciation of the yen.
To remain competitive Japanese companies had to move their prodvkction abroad
causing a certain amount of `hollowixxg out' of indvgstry in Japan. There was a schism
deveiopixxg between these svkccessfvk} compaxxies aitd the inefficient, protected domestic
prodvgcers. The svgccessful companies were feeling more and more handicapped by
Japan's protectionist barriers and the negative impact it was having oit business
abroad as covgntries began to take retaliatory measures. These companies and their
workforce were becoming mvkki-national. The big byword for Japan was `kokztsaika',
intematioxxalisatioxx, and in some areas that is precisely what was occurring. The
pvgb}ic was becoming sophisticated inclvkding awareness that as axx advanced industrial
natioxx their political system was an embarrassmexxt.
   After the re}ative}y popvk}ar regime of Yasvghiro Nakasone, the Prime Ministership
passed to Noborvg Takeshita in X987. He had broken with Tamaka and taken most of
the faction with him. He was very much identified as a prodvkct of the Tanaka school
of politics. His introduction of the indirect sa}es tax (shouhizei) was not popu}ar, not
when there was a growing perception of the `haves' and `have nots' as land assets
rose spectacularly on the stock market. He also alienated the farming vote when
uxxder internationai pressvgre he a}}owed beef and oraxxges to be imported ixxto Japan.
   To make matters worse for Takeshita, another major scandal, the Recruit `shares
for favours' scandai was exposed by the media ixx 1988. It was the worst scandal since
the Lockheed case and again the {Vanaka faction was involved. Takeshita resigned in
April 1989, aiong with maity of the top leadership in the LDP. The scaitdai did not
on}y affect the LDP, members of other parties, including the Socia}ists, were also
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involved. For the first time top officials of the bureavgcracy in the Ministries of
Education and Labour were also implicated. Takeshita's successor, Sosuke Une, was
almost immediately engvglfed in a sex scandal. Normally these kinds of matters are
igxxored by the Japanese press bvkt when it was pvgb}ished ixx a scaitdai magazine aitd
then given prominence in a leading US paper, the Japanese press had no option but
to pvkbiish the story. k fvgrther vgndermined the reputation of the LDP axxd showed
how the e}ectorate was becoming less toleraxxt of their po}iticians. The scandal was
exploited, in particvglar, by the new ieader of the Sociaiist Party, Takako Doi, who
appealed to the female vote to show their disapproval in the Upper House elections
he}d in Jvk}y 1989.
   Many ana}ysts of the period tend to vgnderestimate the impact Takako Doi had on
the downfa}} of the LDP in 1993. Her eiectioxx as party leader in 1986 as the first
woman of axxy party galvanised the pvgblic, especially women voters, into taking a
greater interest in poiitics. She also helped to steer the Sociaiist Party away from its
vgnelectable dogma by rep}acixxg the Soviet/East European socia}ist model with the
`social democratic' mode} of Western Evgropeaxx countries, axxd iater ending hostility to
the US pm Japan Security Treaty. She showed herse}f to be a very capable performer
ixx Parliament and changed perceptions abovkt the Socia}ist Party as vkne}ectable amoxxg
the general pub}ic.
   in the summer electioit for the Upper House, the LDP }ost controi for the first
time in its history. It still had the most seats but could xxo longer re}y on the smooth
passage of legis}atioxx. Not oniy was it a shock for the LDP, it also made the
opposition parties aware that the LDP was vulnerable in the po}ls.
   1989 was a special year in many other ways, the world was changing, the Soviet
communist system was col}apsixxg. Japan was changing, xxot jvgst in po}itics, it was
also the end of ait era with the death of Emperor Hirohito.
                      From the bubble to i994
The LDP reacted to their reversal in the polis by replacing Uxxo with a `clean'
politician. Unfortvgnately all the top leadership was tainted by Recruit so they had to
turn to a secoxxdary-leve} politiciait, Toshiki Kaifvg. Kaifu gave credibi}ity back to the
LDP axxd helped steer them through the X990 Lower House election svgccessfvglly.
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During his tenure Japan came in for severe intemational criticism for xxot giving
military svkpport to the AMes during the Gulf War even though substantia} monetary
aid was provided. The issvge was debated ad navgseum in the Diet and by the time the
Constitvgtion was revised to ailow peacekeeping troops abroad in 1992, the war had
already been won. Akhovggh a sensitive issvge among the Japanese pvgblic, it also
demoxxstrated the inability of the politica} system to act decisive}y in time of iteed
because of interxxal party politics.
   Kaifu tried to push through his owxx anti-corruptioxx electorai reform plans with
the help of Ichiro Ozawa, a Tanaka proteg6, who was centra} to the electora} demise
of the LDP in 1993. 0zawa's motives for reform have been qvkestioned becavkse of his
background axxd his potential involvement ixx corruption especially the Sagawa Kyubin
scandal.i He undovkbtediy saw his opportuitity to gaixx power by captvgring the mood
of the xxation for reform but he may also have fe}t the genuine need for reform, in
particvk}ar, a desire to create sixxgle-seat constitvkencies }eadixxg to the creatioxx of two
viable (conservative) parties akemating in power. The reform plans fai}ed because of
stroxxg resistance not only within the LDP but withixx other parties agaixxst the
perceived threat to vested interests, especial}y the proposals to limit and make fuxxding
of party and individvkal candidates more transparent. Kaifvk did itot have the factioita}
strength to svgcceed.
   The failure to move on e}ectoral reform divided the LDP into two main camps,
those who supported reform and those agaixxst.
   Kaifvg was repiaced by Kiichi Miyazawa in October 1991. This was another
significant turning point in LDP fortvgnes }eading to their downfal} in 1993. Kaifu was
genvgine}y popular amoxxg the e}ectorate becavkse he was seen as an honest poiitician,
his replacement with one of the `old guard' who had been tainted by the Recruit
scaxxda} sigxxalied a retvkrn to the politics of old. The LDP was seen as `ovkt of touch'
with an e}ectorate increasingly urbanised, looking after self-interests axxd the interests
of its main supporters, big bvksiness and farmers (less than five percent of the
population in X989), and xxot the welfare of the covgntry as a whole, axxd in a period of
recession svgch as Japait had never experienced since the war.
   Not long after Miyazawa was in power, yet another major corruption scandal
1 Chalmers Johitson, Jopan: Who govemes.? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995>, pp. 291-231.
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ervgpted - the Sagawa Kyvgbixx scandal implicating Shin Kanemarvg, the LDP Deputy
Prime Minister. Kanemaru was indicted and was made to pay a derisory fine of
¥200,OOO after accepting millioxxs in bribes. Takeshita, like his former boss, Tanaka,
puliing the strixxgs in the background, was himself cavgght up in aitother scandal
involving the Japanese `yakvgza'. Both these scandals shook the party to the core.
Kanemaru fina}ly resigned his post aitd that of factioita} ieader of the Takeshita
faction. Ozawa together with Tsutomu Hata split the Takeshita faction by setting up
a breakaway grovgp knewn as Reform Forum 21, whiie the rest of the faction stayed
loyal to the new faction leader, Keizo Obuchi.
   Miyazawa pvgt forward his owxx election reform proposals based oit `first past the
post' sixxgle-seat constituencies whi}e the opposition parties proposed e}ection reform
based oit proportional representatioit. When the parties fai}ed to reach agreement,
Miyazawa shelved the proposa}s which resvglted in a xxo-confidence vote in the Diet
against his government by the oppositioxx. The vote went agaixxst him when the
Ozawa/Hata faction voted with the opposition. Miyazawa had no choice but to
dissoive Parliament and ca}} a general election for 18 Jvk}y 1993. Prior to the e}ectioit,
not only the Ozawa/Hata group left to form the Shinseito (Japan Renewal) Party but
another group of disaffected LDP members formed the Sakigake Party.
   The scanda}s, rift ixx the party, axxd poor ecoxxomic coxxditions resulted in a
dramatic election resvk}t aitd a record iow tumout of sixty per cent demonstrating the
general disillvgsionment with the who}e political process. The LDP sti}} had the highest
xxumber of seats but not enough for a majority. Even then the LDP showed
complacency expecting to ho}d onto power in coa}ition with a mixxority party. They
were wrong. Ozawa showed his skills as a poiiticiaxx by vknitixxg the opposition parties
under the Premiership of Morihiro Hosokawa, a former LDP politician who ear}y in
1992 had formed the Nihon Shixxto (Japan New) Party. On 9 Avggust 1993 the new
coalition govemment took powex the LDP domination of Japanese politics had fima11y
been broken.
                               C o rm eEww sio rm
Historicaiiy Japaxx's development as a xxatioit state has been very different from the
Western experience. It emerged into the wor}d after 250 years of iso}ationism, a fevgdal
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state with an authoritarian form of govemment. It rep}aced the feudal state system
with a democratic model taken from the West but did net become a democracy by
Westem staxxdards. k remained in essence axx authoritarian state. The po}itica} system
created was conservative axxd nationalistic, which deveioped into a military and police
state in the first half of the twentieth century. Corruption in politics was established
ear}y on in the system.
   The Occupation Forces took over the country with the intention of replacing the
avgthoritarian system with a democratic one based oxx a mix of the British aitd
American mode}s. The moves towards real democracy were reversed by the Occupation
forces as the Cold War deveioped in the iate 1940s axxd the Americans became alarmed
at the rise of radical }eft po}itics, fearing that the country wovgld fal} under the
Communist sphere. As a result, akhough a new constitution was introduced which
altered certain aspects of the system, the reforms did not go far enough and the pre-
war e}ites and the avkthoritariait system svkrvived a}most intact. The LDP net oniy
represented conservative interests and the elites, it was made vgp of them, so the LDP
was ab}e to estabiish itself as the party of power with the support of top bvksiness,
the bvgreavgcracy and control of the media.
   Japan has been xxo different from other developing countries where pork-barrel
po}itics and corruption tend to be the xxorm, but as Japan moved away from being a
deve}oping industria} state to an advanced industrialised one with ait ecoxxomy second
only to the USA, the po}itical party which had he}ped to create the new Japan failed
to change. Not oniy did it faii to change itse}f, it faiied to change the economic
direction of the country. k failed because it did xxot see the need for change and
because it was oniy one part of the "systemX not the sole power to make those
changes. But change was going on ixx society, as Japan became richer and more
integrated into the wor}d of advanced ixxdvgstrialised itations, forces within the system,
particu}ar}y business, and a more educated axxd enlightened popu}atioxx as a whole,
were demanding both po}itical axxd ecoxxomic reform and becoming increasixxgly
disillusioned axxd intolerant of the corruption, not only in politics, but throughout the
system.
   in any Westem democracy, a party so corrupt and out of touch with mainstream
thinkixxg would have been voted out of office axxd remained in oppositioxx uxxti} it
reformed itself axxd its po}icies. Except for very brief periods, the LDP has beexx the
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party of govemment. The opposition has not had access to the same resources to
make a seriovgs cha}lenge to LDP hegemony, bvkt it has a}so proved itseif to be divided
and, on the whole, ineffective and xxot a viable akemative to the LDP.
   The public in general is growing disiliusioned with the poiiticai system axxd the
LDP in particular as it fails to solve the country's economic woes and the coxxtinuing
corruption within the system. This is reflected in the low eiection turnouts. The LDP
has not reformed but it holds on to power because of an e}ectoral system which gives
it a distinct advantage. k svkrvives because there appears to be ito viabie akeritative
and it seems to have the knack of `pvglling new rabbits out of the hat', the latest
beixxg Koizvkmi.
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